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Abstract 
Two  models  of  regulatory  competition  are  contrasted,  one  based  on  a  US 
pattern  of  ‘competitive  federalism’,  the  other  a  European  conception  of 
‘reflexive harmonisation’.  In the European context, harmonization of corporate 
and labour law, contrary to its critics, has been a force for the preservation of 
diversity, and of an approach to regulatory interaction based on mutual learning 
between nation states.  It is thus paradoxical, and arguably antithetical to the 
goal  of  European  integration,  that  this  approach  is  in  danger  of  being 
undermined by attempts, following the Centros case, to introduce a Delaware-
type form of inter-jurisdictional competition into European company law.  
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The  law-making  power  of  nation  states  is  increasingly  being  qualified  by 
principles of transnational economic law.  These norms – variously described in 
terms of the ‘mutual recognition’, ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘country of origin’ 
principles
1 – purport, in the first instance, to remove barriers to the cross-border 
movement of factors of production.  In doing so, they initiate a process in which 
the  law-making  power  of  nation  states  is  subjected  to  external  competitive 
forces.    As  states  compete  with  one  another  to  attract  and  retain  scarce 
economic resources, a new type of market is created, one based on regulatory 
competition. 
 
All markets rest on institutional foundations.
2  These ‘rules of the game’ are not 
solely concerned with protecting existing markets, by enforcing contracts and 
penalizing collusion.  At a more basic level, they constitute markets by defining 
the  elements  of  exchange,  and  in  so  doing  inevitably  frame  the  process  of 
competition.  The market for laws is no different.  The possibility of regulatory 
competition only exists because of rules which set limits to what is permissible 
by way of arbitrage.  Often referred to as ‘derogations’ from the principle of 
freedom  of  movement,  these  constraints  might  better  be  thought  of  as 
constitutive  norms,  without  which  the  market  process  itself  would  lack 
necessary form and definition. 
 
There is a tendency to think of competition as a neutral and technical process 
which  serves  no  particular  end,  other  than  the  goal  of  efficiency.    Since 
‘efficiency’ is to be understood in terms of the maximisation of the aggregate 
welfare or, in certain alternative formulations, the wealth of market actors,
3 it is 
a goal which is likely to command general assent.  Legal rules, by contrast, and 
in particular legislative ones, are seen as serving political goals, which are often 
redistributive in nature, and so likely to be highly contested.  But if markets are, 
themselves, ‘instituted’ orders,
4 which cannot operate in the absence of certain 
normative underpinnings, they too can be seen all too clearly to serve particular 
purposes and values, values which cannot be reduced to the all-embracing logic 
of  welfare  or  wealth  maximisation.    So  it  is  with  the  case  of  regulatory 
competition: outcomes are critically dependent on the way in which the rules of 
the game are designed. 
 
The design of those rules will for the foreseeable future be perhaps the most 
pressing  issue  in  global  economic  governance.    A  number  of  models  are 
available  for  consideration.    The  experience  of  federal  and  quasi-federal   2 
systems of law operating within national and transnational trading blocks will 
be drawn upon.  Thus the US model of inter-state competition provides one 
possible template for global trading rules.  However, it is not the only model 
available.  The western European experience, exemplified in the law governing 
the construction of the single market, is also an important one, which offers an 
alternative perspective.  In particular, it suggests ways in which the ‘framing’ of 
regulatory competition can reconcile the conflicting demands of transnational 
economic integration and national legal diversity.  The distinctiveness of the 
European  approach  is  nevertheless  under  threat,  in  part  because  it  is  being 
compared to an idealized version of the US experience, one which abstracts 
from its historical origins and glosses over some of its consequences. 
 
To address these themes, this paper will first of all outline rival theories of 
regulatory  competition,  and  in  doing  so  will  compare  the  assumptions 
underlying, respectively, the US and European Union approaches to this issue 
(section  2).    It  will  then  contrast  the  experience  of  harmonization  and 
convergence  in  the  fields  of  corporate  and  labour  law  in  the  American  and 
European contexts, drawing out the essential differences between them (section 
3).  Section 4 concludes by reflecting on the future of the European model.  
 
II. Theories and varieties of regulatory competition 
 
Regulatory competition can be defined as a process whereby legal rules are 
selected  and  de-selected  through  competition  between  decentralized,  rule-
making entities, which could be nation states or other political units such as 
regions or localities.  A number of beneficial effects are expected to flow from 
this process.  In so far as it avoids the imposition of rules by a centralized, 
‘monopoly’ regulator, it promotes diversity and experimentation in the search 
for effective laws.  In addition, by providing mechanisms for the preferences of 
the  different  users  of  laws  to  be  expressed  and  for  alternative  solutions  to 
common problems to be compared, it enhances the flow of information on what 
works in practice.  Above all, it allows the content of rules to be matched more 
effectively to the preferences or wants of those consumers, that is, the citizens 
of the polities concerned.  In some versions of the theory, the first two of these 
goals are, in essence, simply the means by which the third is achieved. 
 
The idea of regulatory competition is not new,
5 but it was first formalised within 
the framework of modern welfare economics in the mid-1950s, in relation to the 
issue  of  the  production  of  local  public  goods.    The  timing  is  significant: 
Tiebout’s celebrated paper, entitled ‘A pure theory of public expenditure’, was, 
essentially,  an  application  of  theories  of  general  equilibrium  which  were 
prevalent at the time.
6  The paper constructs a model in which competition   3 
operates on the basis of mobility of persons and resources across the boundaries 
of  local  government  units  within  a  sovereign  state.    In  the  model,  local 
authorities  compete  to  attract  residents  by  offering  packages  of  services  in 
return for levying taxes at differential rates.  Consumers with similar wants then 
‘cluster’  in particular  localities.  The effect is to match local preferences to 
particular levels of service provision, thereby maximizing the satisfaction of 
wants,  while  also  maintaining  diversity  and  promoting  information  flows 
between jurisdictions.   
 
Tiebout’s model is of wider interest because laws, like aspects of local public 
infrastructure, can be seen as indivisible public goods.  By showing formally 
that they can be understood as products which jurisdictions supply in response 
to the demands of consumers of the laws, Tiebout demonstrated the relevance, 
even to public goods of this kind, of a market analogy.  However, in Tiebout’s 
‘pure theory’, freedom of movement was assumed for the purpose of setting up 
the formal economic model.  The model was aimed at showing that, given an 
effective threat of exit, spontaneous forces would operate in such a way as to 
discipline states against enacting laws which set an inappropriately high (or 
low)  level  of  regulation.    Tiebout’s  paper  did  not  set  out  the  institutional 
conditions which would have to be met for the process of competition to occur 
in  the  ‘real’  world;  in  common  with  other  applications  of  the  general 
equilibrium  model  at  this  time,  these  conditions  were  simply  assumed.  
However, the model could be, and was, used as a benchmark against which to 
judge institutional measures aimed at creating regulatory competition.  Since the 
mid-1950s,  the  identification  of  these  conditions  has  become  the  central 
question uniting various new-institutional movements in economics and law; it 
is no longer adequate simply to assume their existence.  Sensitivity to the need 
to consider the institutional framework has not, however, avoided a tendency on 
the part of many analyses to present the ‘pure model’ of unfettered competition 
as the goal to which laws and institutions should be directed, and the debate 
over regulatory competition is no exception to this. 
 
The  most  obvious  institutional  implication  of  the  Tieboutian  model  is  that 
regulatory competition, in its various forms, requires a particular division of 
labour between different levels of rule-making.  It cannot work unless effective 
regulatory authority is exercised by entities operating at a devolved or local 
level.  Law-making powers should be conferred on lower-level units, subject 
only  to  the  principle  that  there  must  be  some  level  below  which  further 
decentralization becomes infeasible because of diseconomies of scale.   
 
But even this gives rise to a need for a federal or transnational body which 
involves  superintending  the  process  of  competition  between  the  lower  level   4 
units.    Individual  units  could  shut  down  competition  unilaterally,  either  by 
placing barriers to the movement of the factors of production beyond their own 
territory, or by denying access to incoming capital, labour and services, or both.  
Hence the central or federal authority has the task of guaranteeing effective 
freedom  of  movement.    This  task,  in  and  of  itself,  may  well  require  active 
interventions of various kinds. 
 
Since,  in  the  ‘real’  world,  mobility  of  persons  and  of  non-human  economic 
resources is self-evidently more limited than it is in the world of pure theory, 
three prerequisites for making exit effective may be identified.  One is the legal 
guarantee of freedom of movement – entry and exit – for persons and resources.  
The  second  is  a  requirement  of  non-discrimination,  sometimes  described  in 
terms of ‘mutual recognition’ or the concept of ‘most favoured nation’ status in 
international  economic  law.    The  third  is  the  acceptance  of  the  presence  of 
unwanted side effects of competition:   ‘externalities’ or spill-over effects of 
various  kinds.      Even  if  there  is  in  general  a  presumption  against  federal 
intervention and in favour of allowing rules to emerge through the competitive 
process, a space remains for harmonization to protect standards against a ‘race 
to the bottom’.  Only the most Panglossian or willfully unobservant would deny 
that this problem exists; the controversy relates to how serious it is, and whether 
harmonization at the federal level is the best way to deal with it. 
 
According to  the school of  thought which can be identified  with the theory 
known as ‘competitive federalism’, the task of analysis is to identify how far the 
‘real world’ departs from the pure theory, and to using legal mechanisms to 
realign the two. Selected institutional interventions can be deployed in such a 
way as to bring supply and demand for laws into equilibrium.  Roger Van den 
Bergh
7  has  described  how  this  approach  would  work  in  the  context  of  the 
European  Union:  it  could  be  used,  in  principle,  to  justify  a  range  of 
mechanisms, including the development by the European Court of Justice of its 
extensive case law on mutual recognition and non-discrimination.  The Cassis 
de Dijon
8 principle can be seen as speeding up regulatory competition, since in 
requiring free movement of goods subject to a mutual recognition principle, it 
not only sets into competition producers from different countries, but does the 
same for the different regulatory regimes under which they were producing.  
The principle of freedom of movement for goods, regarded as a fundamental 
principle within the legal order of the EU and as foundation of the internal 
market, is also a means to the end of more efficient law making within the 
quasi-federal order. 
 
The theory of competitive federalism could also be used to justify measures 
aimed at harmonization in clear cases of a negative externality arising from   5 
imperfect competition.  However, Van den Bergh argued that there should be a 
presumption against federal-level harmonizing legislation, because the negative 
effects of politically-motivated rent-seeking, that is to say, wealth-destroying 
conflicts over distribution. This was because there would be no equivalent, at 
federal level, to the inter-state competition which was going on at the lower 
levels and which would (according to this approach) restrain rent-seeking.
9 
 
Just as there is more than one model of competition in economics, so there is 
more than  way of  understanding regulatory competition.  One alternative to 
competitive federalism has been called the model of reflexive harmonization.
10  
This begins with the idea that competition is not so much a state of affairs in 
which  welfare  is  maximized,  but  a  process  of  discovery  through  which 
knowledge  and  resources  are  mobilized,  the  end  point  of  which  cannot 
necessarily  be  known.    This  type  of  competition  depends  on  norms  which 
establish a balance between ‘particular’ and ‘general’ mechanisms,
11 between, 
that is, the autonomy of local actors, and the effectiveness of mechanisms for 
learning based on experience and observation.  One essential prerequisite is the 
preservation  of  local-level  diversity,  since  without  diversity,  the  stock  of 
knowledge and experience on which the learning process depends is necessarily 
limited in scope.   
 
The  observation  that  ‘hidden  in  the  historical  experience  of  economic 
integration,  there  is  …  a  very  important  aspect  of  “system  dynamics”: 
international competition in the field of the welfare state serves as a kind of 
process of discovery to identify which welfare state package – for whatever 
reason – turns out to be economically viable in practice’
12 might seem to rule 
out  substantial  harmonising  legislation,  and,  indeed,  it  was  advanced  with 
precisely this goal in mind, at a time when there was an active debate about 
extending labour law directives to avoid ‘social dumping’.  In the vein of a neo-
Austrian or Hayekian economic analysis, intervention with the aim of curing so-
called  imperfections  which  prevents  the  market  from  arriving  at  an  optimal 
allocation,  if  not  simply  beside  the  point,  is  actively  harmful.    These 
‘imperfections’, which are simply the differences between systems, are the very 
basis on which learning can take place in a federal order.  In this sense, diversity 
of national systems is an objective in its own right.  It is only on the basis of 
diversity  that  a  wide  range  of  potential  solutions  to  common  regulatory 
problems can emerge.   
 
One  implication  of  this  point  of  view  is  that  to  intervene  with  the  aim  of 
institutionalising  a  single  ‘best’  solution,  through  harmonization,  would  be 
misguided.  However, there is another implication, which is that federal level 
harmonization has a role in maintaining the appropriate relationship between   6 
‘particular’  mechanisms  operating  at  the  sub-federal  level,  and  the  ‘general’ 
mechanisms by which learning across the federal unit as a whole takes place.  
The  model  of  reflexive  harmonization  holds  that  the  principal  objectives  of 
judicial intervention and legislative harmonization alike are two-fold: firstly, to 
protect the autonomy and diversity of national or local rule-making systems, 
while, secondly, seeking to ‘steer’ or channel the process of adaptation of rules 
at  state  level  away  from  ‘spontaneous’  solutions  which  would  lock  in  sub-
optimal outcomes, such as a ‘race to the bottom’.
13  In this model, the process 
by which states may observe and emulate practices in jurisdictions to which 
they are closely related by trade and by institutional connections is more akin to 
the  concept  of  ‘co-evolution’  than  to  convergence  around  the  ‘evolutionary 
peak’ or end-state envisaged by Tiebout’s general equilibrium model.  The idea 
of  co-evolution,  borrowed  from  the  modern  evolutionary  synthesis  in  the 
biological sciences, argues that a variety of diverse systems can co-exist within 
an environment, with each one retaining its viability.
14  It thereby combines 
diversity and autonomy of systems with their interdependence within a single, 
overarching set of environmental parameters.    
 
More generally, theories of reflexive law aim to move beyond a straightforward 
dichotomy between, on the one hand, ‘instrumentalist’ theories of regulation 
and, on the other, ‘deregulatory’ theories which argue for the removal of all 
external  regulatory  controls.
15    One  of  the  problems  with  the  competitive 
federalism model is that it appears to envisage just two forms of regulation: 
‘monopoly’ control from the centre, and the complete absence of such formal 
controls, in favour of competitive  forces.  In practice, a range of options is 
available, some of which combine regulation and competition.  Reflexive law 
theory maintains that it is possible for regulatory interventions to achieve their 
ends not by direct prescription, but by inducing ‘second-order effects’ on the 
part of social actors.  Thus this approach aims to ‘couple’ external regulation 
with self-regulatory processes including those of the market.  The ‘procedural’ 
orientation of reflexive finds expression in laws, for example, which underpin 
and encourage autonomous processes of adjustment, in particular by supporting 
mechanisms of group representation and participation, an approach also finds a 
concrete manifestation in legislation which seeks, in various ways, to devolve or 
confer rule-making powers to self-regulatory bodies.  Thus laws which allow 
collective  bargaining  by  trade  unions  and  employers  to  make  qualified 
exceptions to limits on working time or similar labour standards,
16 or which 
confer statutory authority on the rules drawn up by professional associations for 
the conduct of financial transactions,
17 are example of this effect.   
 
In essence, the idea of reflexive harmonization takes this idea from reflexive 
law theory in general, and applies it to the level of transnational economic law   7 
and the ‘rules of the game’ which govern regulatory competition.  However, the 
distinction between competitive federalism, derived from general equilibrium 
economics  and  the  economic  analysis  of  law,  and  reflexive  harmonization, 
derived from systems theory, is not simply an abstract or theoretical one; it is 
rooted in practice.  In particular, as the next section explains, it reflects the 
different experience of regulatory competition in the USA and the European 
Union. 
 
III.  Regulatory  competition  and  the  evolution  of  the  law  governing  the 
business enterprise in the USA and the EU 
 
The case of Delaware is rightly seen as key to understanding the dynamics of 
regulatory competition in the USA.  The state of Delaware is the principal site 
for the incorporation of larger US companies: over 40% of companies listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange, and over 50% of the top Fortune 500 companies 
are  incorporated  in  that  state.    At  the  two  extremes  of  the  debate  over  the 
Delaware  effect  are  two  views:  one  holds  that  the  Delaware  legislature  and 
courts attracted incorporations by diluting standards of shareholder protection, 
thereby engineering a ‘race to the bottom’;
18 the other maintains that Delaware 
has succeeded because its laws offer the best available set of solutions to the 
problem  of  agency  costs  arising  between  shareholders  and  managers.
19  
Adherents of the race to the bottom hypothesis claim that, although the process 
of law making in Delaware is susceptible to the threat of disincorporation by 
companies, it is managers rather than shareholders who typically take decisions 
relating to the company’s legal domicile.  In the event of potential conflicts of 
interests  between  shareholders  and  managers,  it  is  the  interests  of  the  latter 
which will tend to prevail.  This can be seen in the willingness in the 1990s of 
the Delaware legislature, and to a certain extent of the courts, to adopt rules 
which can be construed as pro-management in the sense of allowing potential 
takeover  targets  to  put  defensive  mechanisms  in  place  against  the  threat  of 
hostile takeover,
20 and in the passage in the 1990s of a law allowing companies 
to opt out of stringent standards of care  in respect of directors’ liability for 
negligence.
21    The  idea  that  Delaware  law  represents  a  lowest  common 
denominator has however been challenged by accounts which insist that any 
attempt by managers to downgrade shareholder interests would, over time, have 
led  to  a  hostile  response  by  the  capital  markets.    Managers  would  have  an 
incentive to incorporate under the law of a state which favoured shareholder 
interests and to shun states which harmed investors, thereby driving up the cost 
of capital.
22   
 
Despite the huge literature which this argument has produced,
23 it is unlikely 
that the debate over the optimality or otherwise of Delaware laws will ever be   8 
clearly resolved, not least because Delaware’s dominance of US corporate law 
makes  it  difficult  to  find  meaningful  benchmarks  against  which  its  own 
performance can be measured.  At its best, the claim that Delaware’s laws have 
been selected for their efficiency lends an air of ex-post rationalisation to a 
process which would have looked very different at most stages in its evolution.  
Delaware’s preeminence is the result of a series of unexpected turns, but also of 
institutional steps which were taken in the nineteenth century which had the 
effect (which was not necessarily intended) of putting in place the conditions for 
inter-state competition over incorporations.  These are often neglected in the 
debate.   
 
Thus  US  regulatory  competition  rests  upon  the  existence  of  a  set  of  prior 
conditions, which provided the basis for freedom of companies to incorporate in 
the state of their choice.  A nineteenth century US Supreme Court decision, 
Paul v. Virginia (1868),
24 established that states were not able to attach special 
requirements to corporations which had been chartered in other jurisdictions as 
a condition of allowing them to do business on their territory.  This was later 
interpreted as meaning that states had to operate a rule of mutual recognition, 
according  to  which  an  incorporation  which  was  effective  in  one  state  was 
acknowledged by the others.
25  This shift occurred in the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century, when New-York based corporations began to reincorporate 
in New Jersey to take advantage of a looser regulatory regime, designed by 
members of the New York corporate bar. In the 1890s and 1900s Delaware 
displaced New Jersey when the latter, under the influence of the Progressive 
political  movement,  introduced  a  number  of  regulatory  constraints  on  large 
corporations including controls over the holding of shares in one company by 
another.  The Delaware corporate regime had been initially designed to facilitate 
the operations of the Du Pont corporation, which, at that stage, was the only 
significant company which was registered in the state.  The Delaware law had 
been  ‘drafted  under  the  auspices  of  the  Du  Pont  family  to  protect  their 
managerial and shareholder interests’, and ‘appeared relatively favourable to 
manager-shareholders of other corporations as well’.
26   Since it obtained its 
initial advantage, a number of factors have served to consolidate Delaware’s 
position.    In  particular,  specialization  means  that  Delaware  now  enjoys  an 
advantage over other states in terms of the large body of case law which it has 
built up, the expertise of its courts and the speed with which they can deal with 
complex  corporate  litigation,  and  a  concentration  of  professional  legal  and 
financial expertise with links to the state.
27   
 
There has been no tendency towards convergence in European company law to 
parallel that of the Delaware effect in the United States.  This could be ascribed, 
straightforwardly  enough,  to  the  much  shorter  period  of  time  during  which   9 
convergence  could  have  taken  place  since  the  foundation  of  the  European 
Community in the 1950s.  Alternatively, the currently influential theory of legal 
origin could be invoked:
28 given the variety of legal systems, common law and 
civil law (French, German and Scandinavian) present in the European Union, by 
contrast to the overwhelmingly common law origin of the legal systems of the 
USA, convergence was not to be expected.  
 
However, it is important, again, to avoid the reading history in a teleological 
fashion, so as to confer an overly functional explanation on outcomes which 
could well have turned out differently.  The Treaty of Rome of 1957 contained 
far-reaching powers to introduce harmonizing measures in the field of company 
law.  These were (and remain) essentially ancillary to the rights of freedom of 
establishment in Articles 43 (ex 52) and 48 (ex 58) of the EC Treaty. Some 
degree of parity or equivalence in the laws protecting shareholders and ‘others’ 
– the latter term could include a range of stakeholder groups
29  – was deemed by 
the Treaty’s drafters to be necessary in order to remove disincentives to the 
movement of companies from one member state to another.  Moreover, during 
the early development of the Community’s company law programme, an active 
case for harmonization was made which echoed the claims advanced at around 
the same time by the ‘race to the bottom’ school in the USA.
30  It was in this 
spirit of protective  regulation that the early company law directives, the so-
called  first  generation  directives  which  were  heavily  prescriptive  in  their 
approach, were adopted.
31  However, this  early emphasis on uniformity and 
prescription soon gave way to more flexible approaches which placed greater 
stress on member state autonomy. ‘Second-generation’ measures typically laid 
down basic accounting and audit standards in the form of a set of options which 
essentially  represented  the  predominant  approaches  which  were  then  in 
operation  in  various  member  states,  while  ‘third’  and  ‘fourth  generation’ 
directives  opened  up  the  harmonization  process  to  the  influence  of  norms 
generated outside the legal process by inter-professional and sectoral bodies.   
 
Why, if harmonization has not resulted in uniformity, has the alternative of a 
market for incorporations emerged, so far at any rate, in the EU?  This is in 
large part the consequence of the lack of a consistent approach on the part of the 
EU member states on the issue of the applicable law of corporate constitutions, 
which in turn is a function of legal diversity.   The UK, along with Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, operates a ‘state of incorporation’ rule, according to 
which  the  applicable  law  is  that  of  the  state  in  which  the  company  is 
incorporated or registered.  The effect of the incorporation approach is that, as 
in the United States, the applicable law is a matter of choice for managers of the 
company or, in the final analysis, for its shareholders (to the extent that they can 
mandate the board to take a particular view of this issue, which is by no means   10 
always the case, or bring about the same outcome through a  proxy fight to 
replace one set of directors with another) ; a company can carry on business in 
one member state while being incorporated in another.  The company laws of 
the state of incorporation will prevail.   
 
This is in contrast to the position in member states which have operated the so-
called ‘real seat’ or siège réel doctrine.  The effects of the siège réel doctrine are 
complex  and  differ  from  one  state  to  another,  and  according  to  the  context 
which  is  being  considered.    Essentially,  however,  it  means  that  courts  will 
regard the applicable law as that of the member state in which the company has 
its main centre of operations – its head office or principal place of business.  If 
the company in question has incorporated elsewhere, a number of consequences 
may  then  follow.    In  some  instances,  the  effect  will  be  to  deny  certain 
advantages of corporate form to the shareholders; in others, the law of the state 
in which the company has its head office will be applied over that of the state of 
incorporation.  In either event, the effect of the siège réel doctrine is to limit 
freedom  of  incorporation;  in  that  sense,  it  obstructs  the  emergence  of  a 
‘Delaware effect’, since a key aspect of that is the principle that entities can be 
incorporated in a state where they have no physical or other business presence.   
 
The legality of the siège réel doctrine under EU law has often been called into 
question  under  the  EC  Treaty,  most  importantly  as  a  result  of  the  Centros 
decision of the European Court of Justice of 9 March 1999, and later cases in 
the same line, Überseering and Inspire Art.
32  In Centros, two Danish citizens 
incorporated  a  private  company  of  which  they  were  the  sole  shareholders, 
named Centros Ltd., in the UK.  One of the two shareholders then applied to 
have  a  ‘branch’  of  the  company  registered  in  Denmark  for  the  purposes  of 
carrying  on  business  there.    A  ‘branch’,  for  this  purpose,  refers  not  to  a 
subsidiary  company,  but  simply  to  a  business  or  trading  presence,  in  one 
country, of a company which is registered in another country.   
 
The Danish Registrar of companies refused to register the branch as requested, 
on the grounds that what the company was trying to do was not to register a 
branch but, rather, its principal business establishment.  The Registrar took the 
view  that  by  incorporating  in  the  UK,  which  has  no  minimum  capital 
requirement  for  private  companies,  and  subsequently  seeking  to  carry  on 
business in Denmark through a branch, the company’s owners were seeking to 
evade the Danish minimum capital requirements which are designed to protect 
third party creditors and minimize the risk of fraud.   In ruling that the refusal to 
accede  to  the  registration  request  was  contrary  to  the  right  of  freedom  of 
establishment under Article 43 (ex Art. 52) of the Treaty, read with Articles 46 
(ex  56)  and  48  (ex  58),  the  Court  took  a  wide  view  of  the  market  access   11 
principle.
33  It is essential to note that at the time of the registration request, 
Centros Ltd. had never traded in the UK, nor was it intended to.  Thus the issue 
in this case was not whether the founders of the company could have access to 
British  company  law  –  they  could,  had  they  wished  to  trade  anywhere  but 
Denmark – nor whether they could trade in Denmark – they could have done 
that too, by incorporating a company there.  The issue was purely whether their 
inability to take advantage of UK company law was a sufficiently significant 
distortion  of  the  ‘competitive  space’  of  the  internal  market  to  constitute  an 
interference with freedom of establishment.  In finding that it did, the Court was 
placing itself at the outer limits of free movement jurisprudence, since this was 
a case involving, at best, a de facto rather than a formal barrier to market access.  
Nor was this a clear case of discrimination on the grounds of nationality.  In 
then going on to conclude that the Danish government had failed to show that 
the refusal to register was proportionate in the circumstances, it substituted its 
own view for that of the legislature on the far from straightforward question of 




The judgment of the ECJ in Centros does not necessarily signify the demise of 
the siège reel principle.  Denmark was one of the states which operated under 
the incorporation rule, so the siège reel principle was not, strictly speaking, 
before the Court.  Nevertheless, dicta in Centros suggest that the siège reel 
principle, as such, may well at some point be seen as contrary to the single 
market rules.  The post-Centros case law suggests that this is the direction in 
which the Court is heading.
 35  Thus Centros is likely to herald a move, sooner 
or later, towards greater jurisdictional competition in EU company law.
36  There 
is empirical evidence to the effect that this is already happening, as the number 
of start-ups from other EU member states which are incorporated in the United 
Kingdom has sharply increased since the early 2000s, while minimum capital 
requirements have been watered down in several countries.
37 
 
A  market  for  incorporations  would  therefore  empower  shareholders,  and 
possibly  managers;  it  is  less  clear  what  its  effects  on  other  corporate 
constituencies, such as creditors and employees, would be.   The Centros case 
itself illustrates how creditors might be negatively affected: if companies had 
the right to move between jurisdictions at will, they would be able to avoid 
otherwise  mandatory  state  laws  which  were  designed  for  the  protection  of 
creditors such as, in this case, a minimum capital requirement.  A ‘race to the 
bottom’ could well result.
38   
 
In the same way, companies could choose whether to observe mandatory laws 
relating to employee participation or codetermination rights, in so far as the   12 
application of such laws was a function of the legal domicile of the company as 
opposed to its physical or economic presence on the territory of a particular 
jurisdiction. The principle of territoriality tends to determine the application of 
most labour law rights, rather than the domicile of the company.
39  This is not 
always the case, however.  The German rules on stakeholder membership of 
supervisory boards relate to the corporate form or legal entity through which an 
organization is constituted, and not just to its physical or business presence.  
Moreover, EU law may one day take a more critical view of the territoriality 
principle in labour law.  If that occurs, the type of distinctions drawn by the 
Court in the Centros case will begin to loom large for the future of social policy 
and not simply for corporate law. 
 
If  companies  could  outflank  codetermination  laws,  for  example,  through 
reincorporation outside the jurisdiction, avoiding the principle of the territorial 
effect of labour laws, there would be little point in states retaining them. If 
legislators and policy makers begin to act in the way predicted by the theory of 
regulatory competition, they will repeal such mandatory laws with the aim of 
attracting more incorporations or retaining those which they already have.  The 
implications for third parties excluded from the decision on incorporation will 
most likely be negative: ‘states competing to attract incorporations will have an 
incentive to focus on the interests of managers and shareholders and to ignore 
the interests of third parties not involved in incorporation decisions’.
40  It seems 
highly possible, then, that a market for incorporations would lead to a reduction 
in mandatory employment and insolvency laws of all kinds.  It is not even 
necessary for there to be large-scale  corporate movements for this to occur; the 
threat might be sufficient.  
 
The siège réel principle was not an historical accident; it was a manifestation of 
the organizational emphasis and stakeholder orientation of the company law 
systems of those member states which had long recognized it.  As long as that 
principle  remained  in  place,  it  was  a  significant  obstacle  to  convergence  of 
systems  upon  a  shareholder-orientated  model.    In  that  sense  it  was  also  a 
significant  guarantor  of  the  diversity  which  the  European  Union  systems 
demonstrated, and which distinguished the European model from the American 
one.   If the siège réel principle is now fraying at the edges, the implications for 
the future of European corporate law are profound. 
 
In the context of the case law on freedom of movement, Centros is an outlier, 
dependent  upon  what  are  arguably  artificial  notions  of  what  constitutes  an 
obstacle to market access.
41  In terms of its implications for the construction of 
the single market, it threatens to replace the distinctive approach to regulatory 
competition  which  has  marked  the  European  experience  to  date.    It  is  not   13 
difficult to believe that the Court has had an eye on the Delaware experience in 
developing its approach in the Centros line of cases.  But if that is the case, it 
may well have overvalued the supposed benefits of the Delaware effect, and 
underestimated its drawbacks. 
 
This difference between the US and Europe is not a straightforward distinction 
between a US solution which favours competitive solutions and a European one 
which favours regulation.  US corporate law contains many highly regulative 
and rigid elements.  The essence of the Delaware effect is a race neither to the 
top  nor  the  bottom,  but  a  race  to  converge.  Delaware  represents  a  race  to 
converge through competition, and has arrived at the predictable result, for such 
unregulated competition, of a near-monopoly supplier.
42  But it is also important 
to bear in mind the role of the federal regulator.  The recent adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  a  reminder  that  there  are  extensive  federal  powers  to 
legislate  in  the  field  of  corporate  and  securities  law,  and  that  Delaware’s 
preeminence is to a large degree the consequence of the decision of the federal 
legislature not to intervene when it could do so.  There is, indeed, a substantial 
track  record  of  intervention  by  the  federal  legislature  when  inter-state 
competition is seen to have failed.  Moreover, harmonization here tends to take 
a particularly rigid form which is largely absent from EU corporate and labour 
law: this is the solution of federal preemption.  This is, perhaps, why critics of 
US federal regulation in such areas as company law and labour law argue so 
vociferously that it acts as a ‘monopoly regulator’, excluding all scope for state 
initiative.
43  The restriction of state initiative has occurred in relation both to 
securities regulation and the law governing collective bargaining.  In each of 
these areas, the federal legislature intervened in the 1930s to cure what were 
seen as fundamental failings of state-level regulation.  The courts subsequently 
applied the preemption doctrine to hold that these federal regulations ‘occupied 
the field’ in such a way as to prevent the states legislating in the area.  This form 
of  pre-emption  contains  a  strong  version  of  centrally-imposed  uniformity: 
where  it  applies,  states  are  not  simply  prevented  from  derogating  from  the 
standards set by the federal legislature; it is very often the case that they cannot 
improve  on  them  either.    The  Securities  Act  of  1933,  the  Securities  and 
Exchange Act 1934 and the National Labor Relations Act 1935 are still very 
largely  in  force  today,  notwithstanding  long-standing  criticisms  from 
commentators on all sides of the policy debate who argue that a return to state 
autonomy would better serve the policy goals of intervention in these areas.   
 
A core characteristic of US-style competitive federalism, then, is not simply the 
presence of a particular form of inter-state competition, but also the use of a 
certain type of centralized regulation as a way of achieving policy goals when 
inter-state competition breaks down.  The description of a ‘monopoly regulator’   14 
which US critics use to attack federal intervention is entirely appropriate in a 
system which tends to react to extreme failures in the market for regulation by 
shutting down competition entirely.  The criticisms may be justified, but the 
critics  should  also  recognize  that  the  counterpoint  of  unbridled  competition 
versus monopoly regulation has a certain logic to it: it is precisely because the 
system  of  decentralized  lawmaking  so  often  led  to  extreme  coordination 
failures, as in the case of the capital markets and labour markets of the 1930s, 
that  the  federal  legislature,  in  its  turn,  came  to  intervene  with  the  goal  of 
shutting down inter-competition entirely in contexts where it was perceived to 
have failed. 
 
A  different  logic  underpins  the  transnational  harmonization  of  laws  in  the 
European Community.  Here, the purpose of harmonization is not to substitute 
for state-level regulation; hence, the transnational standard only rarely operates 
to  ‘occupy  the  field’  in  the  manner  of  a  ‘monopoly  regulator’.    Rather, 
transnational standards in effect seek to promote diverse, local-level approaches 
to regulatory problems by creating a space for autonomous solutions to emerge 
when, because of market failures, they would not otherwise do so.
44  Directives 
in the areas of labour law offer a good example of this, since they are almost 
invariably interpreted as setting basic standards in the form of a ‘floor of rights’.  
Although ‘downwards’ derogation is prohibited, member states are allowed, and 
implicitly encouraged, to improve on the standards set centrally.
45  Far from 
being  a  ‘straitjacket’,  then,  which  restricts  local  autonomy,  central-level 
intervention is the precondition for continued local-level experimentation.  
 
Directives in the area of corporate law have also drawn on this philosophy.   In 
particular, company law harmonization was influenced by the ‘new approach’ 
to  harmonization  which  the  Commission  instituted  around  the  time  of  the 
passage of the Single European Act in 1986 and the initiation of the single 
market  programme.    The  ‘new  approach’  began  in  the  context  of  product 
standard  harmonization,  where  it  established  a  principle  that  Community 
intervention should be limited to the harmonization of essential safety-related 
requirements.  It also established the ‘reference to standards’ approach, under 
which it was presumed that a product which conformed to a standard set by a 
European-level body, or, failing that, with the relevant national standard, also 
complied with EC law.
46  In this context, the Twelfth Company Law Directive, 
on single-member private companies (1989),
47 which was adopted in pursuance 
of the Community’s goal of promoting the growth of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, explicitly left a range of regulatory issues concerning disclosure of 
information and creditor protection to be decided at member state level.    Later 
measures took the process a stage further by adopting a ‘framework’ model for 
directives.    This  again  favoured  the  articulation  of  general  principles  or   15 
standards rather than the promulgation of rigidly prescriptive rules.  However, 
new techniques were also involved.  The aim was to achieve policy goals by 
linking regulatory interventions to the activities and processes of autonomous 
rule-making  bodies,  such  as  industry-level  associations  and  self-governing 
professional organizations in the financial sector.  The more recent Thirteenth 
Directive,
48  on  takeover  bids,  exemplifies  this  approach,  in  particular  in  the 
scope it provides for its general principles to be implemented through local-
level  action  by  self-regulatory  bodies  such  as  takeover  panels,  and  in  the 
specific provision which it makes for continued national-level divergence on 
matters such as takeover defences and the role of employee consultation. 
 
In short, there is no one, all-embracing model of regulatory competition.  The 
Delaware experience is the singular of a particular trajectory, possibly unique, 
and  is  unlikely  to  be  repeated  in  the  same  form  elsewhere.    The  European 
Union’s different trajectory reflects the particular conditions under which the 
national  systems  evolved  and  under  which  the  harmonisation  programme 
developed.    In  both  systems,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  nature  of  regulatory 
competition  is  dependent  on  the  particular  institutional  environment  or 
‘framework’  which  defines  the  relevant  relationships  between  the  different 
levels  of  rule  making.    Systems  which  approximate  to  the  model  described 
above  in  terms  of  ‘competitive  federalism’  tend  to  give  rise  to  a  race  to 
converge which could be either a race to the top or to the bottom; an optimal 
outcome is not guaranteed.  The solution to extreme market  failures, which 
would  otherwise  lock  in  inefficient  rules,  is  preemption,  that  is,  federal 
intervention  which  occupies  the  field  to  the  complete  exclusion  of  local 
initiative; but this, too, risks locking in inefficiency.  By contrast, in the model 
of ‘reflexive harmonization’, intervention has the goal of preserving diversity in 
order to make it possible for regulatory competition to operate as a process of 
discovery, based on mutual learning between states.   
 
IV.  Conclusion:  the  prospects  for  the  European  model  of  regulatory 
competition 
 
This paper has argued that regulatory competition in corporate and labour law in 
Europe has taken a distinctive form, through which harmonization, far from 
limiting  national  diversity  as  some  of  its  critics  have  feared,  has  served  to 
maintain it.  This is a feature of a particular regulatory style, referred to here as 
‘reflexive  harmonisation’,  which  developed  to  match  the  highly  divergent 
regimes  which  operate  within  the  EU  for  the  regulation  of  the  business 
enterprise.  By contrast, the predominant regulatory style in the USA has been a 
‘race to converge’ through, on the one hand, jurisdictional competition which 
has  been  unmediated  by  any  harmonizing  framework  of  basic  rules  and,   16 
secondly,  federal  legislation  which,  where  it  applies,  preempts  state-level 
initiative.  It was further suggested that the advantages of inter-state competition 
as a mode of regulatory inteaction should be thought of in terms of the learning 
process which it engenders, which presupposes the maintenance of diversity, 
rather than in terms of the convergence of systems on a supposedly single best 
model. 
 
At a fundamental level, the debate between European and American approaches 
is one of the prevailing conception of the relationship between regulation and 
the market.  The US literature, particularly the standard law and economics 
approach, views regulation as external interference in private ordering, to be 
justified only where a clear market failure can be demonstrated.  By contrast, 
the predominant European approach has been to see regulation, and the legal 
system more generally, as constituting the market order, an approach which is 
compatible  with  the  idea  that  regulatory  and  market  forces  will  more  often 
complement  than  oppose  each  other.    It  would  be  paradoxical,  under  these 
circumstances, for the European approach to mimic US practice, and seek to 
initiate a Delaware-style process of interstate competition in company law, or 
any other area for that matter.  That may well be the direction to which EU 
policy is leaning.  But when state laws are seen as a ‘distortion’ of competition 
in  the  otherwise  empty  ‘space’  of  the  single  market,  a  reassessment  of  that 
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